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Abstract— As network infrastructures become more and more
complex, network protection, accordingly, becomes a harder and
harder task to fulfill. In order to cope with the frequent changes
in the monitored scenarios, we propose a system which, by
observing users’ behaviors and auditing the security status of
the network, exploits grid services in order to correctly deploy
the required security modules, aimed at assuring a prescribed
security level.
I. INTRODUCTION
The wide deployment of new services and applications over
the Internet imposes the careful project of network infras-
tructures, in order to face the new potential threats coming
from either accidental events or malicious users. Indeed, the
complexity of the offered services, as well as the everchanging
new threat methodologies, require the definition of a new ap-
proach to network security. This new approach must cope with
the problem of both defining a new user behavior (in order
to point out the potential malicious usage of the network),
and developing new systems capable to dynamically detect
and react to threats. According to the new paradigm named
Autonomic Communication [1], the issues above should be
faced by assuming at the outset that network entities (either
network users or the components of a defensive system) can
be grouped into communities, each community representing
a set of elements sharing some features and interests and
cooperating in order to reach a well-defined objective.
Based on the above considerations, we have defined a novel
approach to network analysis, design and implementation,
named Behavioral Network Engineering. Such an approach
concerns all services and applications that require knowledge
of the network users’ behavior in order to effectively operate.
Intrusion Detection represents an interesting example of an
application which can highly benefit of the adoption of such
an approach.
In the following we will first introduce the general idea
of Behavioral Network Engineering, by proposing a model
for the definition of user’s behavior. Then, we will describe a
framework for intrusion detection based on such a model, and
embracing the “autonomic” approach.
II. BEHAVIORAL NETWORK ENGINEERING
Network services and applications mandatorily impose to
adapt the network to new users’ needs through the develop-
ment of innovative techniques for traffic and resource engi-
neering. Given the strict correlation between users’ behavior
and network resources management, it becomes of paramount
importance to obtain users’ information in order to optimize
network operation. To assure this requirement, we propose
a comprehensive approach, named Behavioral Network Engi-
neering, which aims at exploiting data about users’ behavior
in order to effectively manage, secure and dimension the
network.
Behavioral Network Engineering exploits information about
both the user’s behavior and the current network status in order
to define the proper actions to be performed onto the network.
Context information and users’ profiles together contribute
to the extraction of the behavioral knowledge needed to
successfully build an autonomic system.
As stated before, network security systems, and in particular
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), represent the main net-
working application exploiting users’ behavioral information
in order to detect malicious activities ongoing in the network.
An IDS needs to know what all users are doing, in order to
effectively face the threats carried out by the malicious ones.
Moreover, this information must also take into account the
relationships among the sets of users sharing common features,
resources and purposes. Unfortunately, the current real-time
intrusion detection systems do not adopt any user characteri-
zation including such “inter-users” information. A Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS), for example, is generally realized
through coordinating activities involving actors which are
widely distributed throughout the network. According to this
property, we claim that the detection of such attacks also
requires the knowledge of information regarding the “coop-
eration” among different network entities. Such entities share
the same “purpose” (i.e. the compromission of either a service
or a single host) and make use of the same resources (e.g. those
belonging to the network infrastructure) in order to fulfill their
task. For this reason, the set of hosts involved in a DDoS attack
can be considered as a “community”, whose members all aim
to achieve the same result. Thus, the information about this
community as a whole can also contribute to realize a deeper
knowledge, i.e. the behavioral information, needed to improve
the detection process.
According to these considerations, for the proposed IDS we
have adopted a user behavior model which includes both single
user and community information. An example of such a model
is the one proposed in [2]. Lee and Stolfo identify every single
network connection as a network user. User behaviors are in
turn specified by means of a set of parameters collectively
known as connection features. Among such features, those
containing information about a single connection are called
intrinsic features. On the other hand, features summarizing
information about all the connections sharing common proper-
ties are called traffic features. In our model, these last features
represent the information on the user community needed in
order to effectively identify malicious behaviors.
III. A FRAMEWORK FOR INTRUSION DETECTION
In order to develop a complete system able to detect intru-
sions, it is well known that several components are needed,
each in charge of implementing one key functionality of the
system. Of course, we need:
• a sniffer, committed to capture packets while they flow
through the network;
• a so called preprocessor, which extracts high level infor-
mation about the behavior of a particular entity of the
network. This is done by elaborating sniffed packets;
• a classifier which is in charge of deciding, based on some
set of classification criteria, whether or not the examined
behavior is normal.
We propose to look at the network as a self-aware and a
self-healing environment. In such an environment, a distributed
framework for network protection, still complying with the
inherently monolithic IDS structure described above, and
capable of providing a previously agreed upon protection level,
is well suited. A distributed system allows the separation of
concerns among a well-defined set of entities, each suited to
deal with a particular aspect of the problem. This on one hand
simplifies the task of each involved entity, and on the other
hand allows a deeper specialization of each module (which can
thus be modified without necessarily affecting performance
of the overall system). If we assume that the network be
aware of itself, security assurance might be regarded as a
service inherently provided by network infrastructures. In such
a scenario, a framework capable to deploy, both proactively
and reactively, on-demand security services is well suited. The
IDS structure described above relies on single entities, each
performing just one of the prescribed tasks. A distributed IDS,
instead, would naturally adapt itself to a much more context-
aware deployment of the available resources, thus allowing a
more effective placement of the modules.
We propose a system which, by means of a grid-based
infrastructure, dynamically deploys the entities in charge of
providing network security, based on the knowledge of the
security status of the network and its components. In order
to accomplish its task, the IDS might need several probes
sniffing traffic in crucial points of the network, and several
classification nodes, each exploiting the best fitting detection
technique according to the system status and node location. A
broker entity is also needed, capable to instruct all the network
nodes to execute a specific application server together with the
appropriate grid services.
Such a dynamically distributed system might, for instance,
adapt itself at the occurrence of a DDoS attack, by ap-
propriately placing intrusion detection engines in the most
critical nodes (i.e. the nodes along the attackers’ path) and by
coordinating such nodes through a flexible signalling protocol
(e.g. a protocol for tracing back the attack).
A. A multiclassifier approach
As far as intrusion detection is concerned, there exist four
possible outcomes for a system attempting to classify users’
behaviors. Indeed, besides the correct detection of normal
behavior or of an attack pattern, a classifier might mistake an
attack for normal behavior, thus resulting in a missed detec-
tion, or some normal operations for an attack, thus generating
a false alarm. The correctness of such outcomes of a classifier
is the main criterion for evaluating the effectiveness of such
instruments. Though mistaking the occurrence of an event for
any other event might seem equally harmful, regardless which
class of events is mistaken for which other class, not all errors
are equally severe. In the context of intrusion detection, missed
detections have different importance than false alarms, and
tougher endeavors are needed for coping with the minimization
of the one out of such two parameters which is deemed to be
the most important. Unfortunately, there exists a well known
trade off between false alarms and missed detections, which
can’t thus be minimized together.
By exploiting the natural capability of the aforesaid dis-
tributed framework, we can try to decrease the number of
classification errors by exploiting the detection capabilities
of several classifiers of different types, also using artificial
intelligence algorithms. While a single classifier can’t be too
specialized in solving each of the problems it faces, several
smaller classifiers may be chosen in order for each one of
them to cope with a subset of the problem. This allows us to
reach a higher specialization degree, and to perform a better
detection on the few attack classes that a single classifier can
discover within the network traffic. Multiclassifier systems are
widely used in intrusion detection problems, and they usually
perform better than systems based on a single classifier, thus
encouraging in the exploitation of such a technique.
IV. CONCLUSION
A self-aware and self-organizing IDS is proposed, which
exploits several artificial intelligence techniques, by suitably
combining their outcomes, aimed at correctly detecting intru-
sions, by providing the security administrator with as few false
alarms and as many correctly detected attacks as possible.
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